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NOTE 
ASYLUM FOR A MINOR CHILD 
OF PERSECUTED PARENTS 
IN ZHANG v. GONZALES 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty-five years, the government of China has 
adopted coercive family-planning policies to combat overpopulation. l 
Family-planning officials dictate when or if couples may marry and 
regulate a couple's decision to bear children.2 Among the family-
planning policies is "one couple, one child.,,3 If a couple violates this 
policy by having two or more children, the government requires one 
parent to undergo sterilization, and the family is often fined.4 Refusal to 
comply with these coercive measures can be disastrous for all family 
members. 
These are the circumstances underlying the Ninth Circuit's asylum 
case of Zhang v. Gonzales.s One morning, government officials entered 
the Zhang household in rural China.6 The officials removed Ms. Xue 
Yun Zhang's father and forced him to undergo sterilization that caused 
permanent harm to his health.7 The government also penalized the 
Zhang family with a substantial fine for violating the family-planning 
1 Susan Greenhalgh & Edwin A. Winckler, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Perspective Series: Chinese State Birth Planning in the 1990s and Beyond, at xix (2001), available 
at uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylumlric/documentation/pschnO 1 00 I.pdf. 
2 Michael Weisskopf, One Couple, One Child: Abortion Policy Tears at China's Society, 
Wash. Post, Jan. 7,1985, at AI. 
3 [d. 
4 Greenhalgh & Winckler, supra note I, at 6-7. 
5 Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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policy.S Due to his weakened condition Ms. Zhang's father was unable 
to support his family or pay the government fine.9 As a result, the 
government barred the Zhang children from attending school. IO The 
Zhang family was devastated by their father's sterilization. I I The trauma 
left the family destitute and the children without access to education.12 
Shortly thereafter, the Zhang family's oldest child, Ms. Xue Yun Zhang, 
left for the United States, hoping to receive an education and gain 
employment in this country.13 However, instead of being able to pursue 
her dreams, she was detained upon entry and has been fighting to stay 
ever since.14 
In Zhang v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit considered for the first time 
whether an unaccompanied minor child of a parent who was forcibly 
sterilized should be automatically eligible to apply for asylum. Deferring 
to the statutory interpretation adopted by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA"), the court found against the child. 15 The court's 
opinion retreated from earlier dictum suggesting that the refugee statute 
could reasonably be extended to grant automatic eligibility to a child.16 
However, the court went on to hold that the parents' political opinion -
in the form of resistance to coercive population controls - could still be 
imputed to the child for purposes of establishing asylum eligibility based 
on persecution suffered by the child. 17 Because the BIA's decision on 
this issue - that Ms. Zhang had not suffered persecution - was not 
supported by sufficient evidence, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for 
further proceedings. IS 
Part I of this Note provides a background of Chinese population-
control policies, a discussion of the applicable fundamental rights 
recognized in domestic and international law, and United States asylum 
law. 19 Part II provides the factual and procedural history of the Zhang 
case and outlines the Ninth Circuit's decision.2o 








IS [d. at 1242; see 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (Westlaw through 2(06). 
16 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1245; see Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004). 
17 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1246-47. 
18 [d. at 1247-50. 
19 See infra notes 23-95 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 96-131 and accompanying text. 
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agrees that the court correctly deferred to the BIA's statutory 
construction in holding that Ms. Zhang was outside the scope of the 
automatic-eligibility provision 21 Part III further contends that the court 
also correctly held that Ms. Zhang would be eligible for asylum if she 
had herself been persecuted on the basis of her parents' resistance to 
coercive population-control measures. Appropriately, therefore, the 
primary issue in the case on remand will be the evaluation of whether the 
hardships suffered by Ms. Zhang rose to the level of "persecution,'.22 
Part IV concludes that when a minor child of a parent who suffered 
persecution by the Chinese government for a violation of their 
population-control policies claims asylum, the child's claims should be 
judged on their own merits. The Zhang court should have taken the 
opportunity to provide guidance on which particular hardships 
cumulatively rise to persecution, keeping in mind that a child's harm 
may be relatively less than an adult's and still qualify as persecution. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Opposition to Chinese birth-control policies is one of many grounds 
currently recognized for asylum protection under United States and 
international law. 
A. CHINA'S POPULATION-CONTROL POLICY 
Chairman Mao Zedong declared the formation of the People's 
Republic of China on October 1, 1949.23 In the 1950's Mao wished to 
produce a more prosperous nation by increasing the population.24 He 
reasoned that more people would provide more "productive hands 
waiting to work.,,25 However, after about twenty years, the population 
boom in China threatened to outgrow its agricultural capacity.26 The 
government realized that to become economically modern, reduce 
poverty, and ensure national survival, China had to control its population 
21 See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42)(B) (Westlaw through 2(06). 
22 See infra notes 132-178 and accompanying text. 
23 Greenhalgh & Winckler, supra note I, at 168. 
24 Stephen Mufson, Population Curbs Slip in China, 1.2 Billion Reached Five Years Early, 
Wash.Post,Feb.14,1995,atAI7. 
25 1d. 
26 See Mufson, supra note 24, at AI7 ("Lester Brown of Worldwatch Institute has written 
that China's population growth, the disappearance of Chinese fannland and continued industrial 
expansion would make China a big food importer, disrupting world food markets, in about 20 to 30 
years."); Weisskopf, supra note 2, at Al ("The one-child policy was launched in 1979."). 
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growth. 27 This became a national priority and culminated in the "one 
couple, one child" regulation promulgated in 1979?8 The government's 
subsequent policy changes contained extensive regulations restricting the 
right to marry and the right to have children, which are only nominally 
protected by China's law and constitution.29 
Beyond the implementation of many economic and social reforms, 
governance and social control in the People's Republic of China are 
largely based on collective action, group decisions, and social pressure.3D 
These social attitudes significantly influence and control individuals' 
personal and professionallives?l 
All Chinese citizens belong to a workplace or rural governing unie2 
headed by government officials who enforce the government's policies 
and regulations.33 These officials control salaries, housing allocation, 
land-ownership rights, crop-growing rights, educational opportunities, 
and the ability to marry and to have children.34 
Each unit contains a birth-control committee responsible for the 
enforcement of birth-control policies.35 Government officials must 
ensure that their unit stays within its birth quota, but there are no formal 
policies dictating how unit officials are to enforce and control the 
quotas.36 Some officials track menstruation dates and birth-control 
methods of all women of child-bearing age.37 Adherence to the "one 
couple, one child" policy requires a couple with one child to use long-
term birth control. 38 After the birth of the first child, the government 
often orders IUDs to be inserted without the woman's consent. 39 If a 
27 Mufson, supra note 24, at A17. 
28 1d. 
29 Id.; see U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 
(China) (2001), available at http://www.state.govlgldrVrlslhrrptl2000/eap/684.htm ("The 
Constitution and laws provide for fundamental human rights; however, these protections often are 
ignored in practice."). 
30 Ben-Fu Li, Informed Consent in Research Involving Human Subjects, 15 1. CLINICAL 
ETHICS, 35, 36 (2004). 
31 1d. 




36 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (China), 
supra note 29, at "f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, Correspondence." 
37 Weisskopf, supra note 2, at AI. 
38 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (China), 
supra note 29, at "f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, Correspondence." 
39 Greenhalgh & Winckler, supra note I, at 5. An IUD is an intrauterine device that is used 
as one of several forms of birth-control methods. 
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couple has two children, one parent is strongly encouraged to be 
sterilized.4o Doctors are to abort unplanned pregnancies immediately,41 
but to follow the birth-control policy doctors may perform late-term 
abortions up to the time of birth.42 Observance of the "one couple, one 
child" policy in urban areas is strong, due to strict enforcement and the 
increasing costs of education and child-rearing.43 Because the demands 
of farm labor require more workers, units in rural areas generally allow a 
couple to have two children if the first child is a girl or is handicapped.44 
Officials often take coercive measures to prevent violation of the 
unit's birth quota.45 Although the practice has been on the decline since 
the late 1980' s, unit officials may use physical force against offending 
couples to comply with the birth quota.46 Neighbors and colleagues are 
encouraged to publicly criticize offending couples.47 In some cases, unit 
officials may financially penalize even compliant co-workers of a unit if 
the unit exceeds its birth quota.48 China characterizes any resistance to 
the "one couple, one child" policy as political dissent,49 and higher-ups 
may reprimand unit officials for violations within their unit and may 
withhold their salary bonuses.50 
China's implementation and coercive enforcement of the current 
population-control policies often involve persecution and violation of 
basic human rights recognized under both international and United States 
40 [d. at 7. 
41 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (China). 
supra note 29. at Hf. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy. Family. Home. Correspondence." 
42 Greenhalgh & Winckler. supra note I. at 33. 
43 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (China). 
supra note 29. at Hf. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy. Family. Home. Correspondence." 
44 [d. 
45 [d. ("Rewards for couples who adhere to family planning policies include monthly 
stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits. Disciplinary measures against those who 
violate policies can include fines (sometimes called a 'fee for unplanned birth· or a 'social 
compensation fee'). withholding of social services. higher tuition costs when the child goes to 
school. demotion. and other administrative punishments that sometimes result in loss of 
employment. "). 
46 Greenhalgh & Winckler. supra note I. at 17. 
47 U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (China). 
supra note 29. at "f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy. Family. Home. Correspondence." 
48 1d. 
49 145 Congo Rec. E1159-01 (extension of remarks. June 8. 1999). In the United States this 
political dissent is considered a political opinion for purposes of asylum eligibility. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 
1. & N. Dec. 915. 922 (BIA 1997) (Hone who opposes or resists a coercive population control 
program involving forced abortion and sterilization because he or she believes that it is wrong or 
improper on personal. ethical. religious or philosophical grounds. holds a political opinion."). 
50 Greenhalgh & Winckler. supra note I. at 18. 
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law.51 Such persecution may become the basis of an asylum claim of a 
person who subsequently enters the United States seeking protection.52 
B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Fundamental rights, as recognized by international law, include the 
right to privacy, marital sanctity, and bodily integrity. These rights are 
enumerated in international human rights law under the United Nations' 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.53 The Declaration 
specifically protects the rights to marry, form a family, and obtain an 
education.54 It protects the right to be free from arbitrary interference in 
"privacy, family, home or correspondence.,,55 Congress and the courts 
have recognized similar fundamental rights in the United States.56 
Although many fundamental privacy rights are not articulated in the 
United States Constitution, courts have found them to exist by 
implication.57 In 1972 the United States Supreme Court held in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.,,58 Government-imposed birth-control 
policies reject fundamental privacy rights; Congress has thus made 
opposition to these policies an express basis for asylum. 59 Enforcement 
by Chinese officials in Zhang of their coercive population-control 
policies resulted in the violation of the fundamental rights of Ms. Zhang 
and her parents. 
C. UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW 
United States asylum law60 is governed by domestic law but is also 
51 U.s. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (China), 
supra note 29, at "f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, Correspondence"; see, e.g., 
Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). 
52 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437-39. 
53 Universal DecIaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. Al180 (1948). 
54 [d. arts. 16(1),26(1). 
55 [d. art. 12. 
56 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
57 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
58 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
59 megal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-
546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 10 1 (a)(42)(B) (1996) (Westlaw through 2006». 
60 This Note focuses on the law in force at the time of Ms. Zhang's asylum application. 
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guided by international agreements such as the 1967 United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("UN Protocol,,).61 The 
relevant federal statutes governing asylum include the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("INA"),62 the Refugee Act of 1980 ("Refugee Act"),63 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 ("IIRIRA"),64 and the REAL ID Act of 2005.65 
The objective of the Refugee Act was to establish permanent 
procedures for the admission of refugees into the United States.66 The 
Refugee Act amended the INA to conform to the UN Protoco1.67 The 
definition of the term "refugee" from the UN Protocol was adopted 
nearly verbatim in the Refugee Act as: 
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, 
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a 
However, the primary contention of this Note-that the circumstances of a parent's persecution, 
including the parent's involuntary sterilization, are relevant in determining whether the child has 
been persecuted-remains applicable under current law. 
61 Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421, 437-39 (1987). 
62 8 U.S.c. § 1101 et seq. (Westlaw through 2006). 
63 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
64 Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
65 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (May 11,2005) (Westlaw 
through 2006). The REAL ID Act of 2005 applies to new applications for asylum filed on or after 
May II, 2005, and does not apply to Ms. Zhang's case. Going forward, asylum applicants have a 
higher burden of proof and must establish a clear nexus between persecution and at least one of the 
five protected grounds as the central reason for the persecution. See also US REAL ID Act Changes 
Asylum Law (2005), 
http://www .asylumlaw.orglindex.cfm?fuseaction=showNewsltem&siteNewsID= 157. The new 
standard for sufficiency of evidence is that the U may grant asylum on testimony alone as long as it 
is credible, persuasive and points to sufficiently specific facts to demonstrate the applicant is a 
refugee. [d. Attorneys should try to gather corroborating evidence as well. [d. The new standard for 
credibility is that the trier of fact can base the determination on demeanor, candor or responsiveness 
when considering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including inherent 
plausibility of the applicant's story, consistency between written and oral statements, internal 
consistency of each statement, consistency of statements with evidence of record and State 
Department Reports, and any falsehoods or inaccuracies contained in the statements. [d. 
66 Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (Westlaw through 2006)). 
Any refugee who is physically present in the United States may apply for asylum within one year 
after the date of the alien's arrival in the United States. !d. If the Attorney General determines the 
alien is a refugee under an applicable statute, the Attorney General may grant asylum to the 
applicant. [d. Asylum may be granted for an indefinite period, but asylum status does not 
automatically give the asylum grantee the right to remain in the United States permanently. [d. 
Asylum grantees may be returned to their country by the United States during the asylum grant. [d. 
67 Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (the United States acceded to the 
protocol in 1968). 
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well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationalitv, membership in a particular social group, or political 
.. 6g' 
opinIOn. 
An applicant may be classified a refugee by the United States 
government based on anyone of these five protected grounds.69 
To qualify for protection70 as a refugee or asylee under the Refugee 
Act, (1) the applicant must have suffered past persecution or have a fear 
of future persecution; (2) the fear must be well-founded; (3) the 
persecution must be on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a social group, or political opinion; and (4) the applicant must be 
unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality or to the 
country in which he or she last habitually resided because of the 
persecution or well-founded fear of persecution.71 
"Persecution" has been defined as "the infliction of suffering or 
harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive.,,72 
Substantial economic deprivation, although not required to be the total 
deprivation of all means of earning a livelihood, is sufficient to constitute 
persecution.73 
Persecution claims generally arise in two forms.74 First, if past 
persecution is established there is a presumption that the applicant has a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the future that can be overcome only 
if the INS75 can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
conditions in the applicant's country have changed.76 Second, past 
persecution may be established without a well-founded fear of future 
persecution if the past persecution was so severe that there are 
68 8 U.S.c. § I 101 (a)(42)(A) (Westlaw through 2006) (emphasis added). 
69 Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2004). 
70 The applicant bears the initial burden of proving these requirements. 8 U.S.c. § 
1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (Westlaw through 2006). The applicant's testimony alone may be sufficient to 
sustain the burden of proof without corroboration, if the trier of fact finds that the applicant is 
credible and persuasive and has referred to specific facts to demonstrate that he or she is a refugee. 8 
U.S.c. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Westlaw through 2006). 
71 Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421,428 (1987). 
72 Kovac v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969). 
73 1d. 
74 Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec 16, 18 (BIA 1989). 
75 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service into the Department of Homeland Security. Most of the functions were transferred to the 
Bureau of Border Security and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). This Note refers to the INS since it was the relevant agency at the 
time of Ms. Zhang's application. 
76 8 C.P.R. § 208.l3(b)(l)(ii) (Westlaw through 2006), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(A) (Westlaw 
through 2006). 
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compelling reasons for being unwilling to return.77 Because of the 
severity of past persecution needed for the second method, most 
applicants establish their claim using the first. 
The presumption that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution arises when the applicant shows subjective fear, objective 
fear, and persecution on account of a protected ground.78 A subjective 
fear of harm can be established if the applicant's testimony regarding his 
or her fear is credible.79 The objective component of a reasonable 
possibility (not requiring probability) of persecution requires a showing 
of "some direct, credible evidence supporting the claim,"so under a 
reasonable-person standard.sl The third element is an explanation of the 
mistreatment or the reason for the persecution, which requires a nexus 
between the infliction of harm and one of the five enumerated grounds.s2 
At the time Zhang was decided, the nexus requirement was simply a 
connection between persecution that was "at least in part" on account of 
one of the five enumerated grounds.s3 
As late as 1989, the United States did not view punishment suffered 
under a government's coercive population-control policies as sufficient 
to qualify individuals for asylum eligibility, because these laws were 
considered to apply to the population in general "as a set of incentives 
for limiting the size of families," instead of persecuting individuals.s4 In 
1996 Congress reversed its position on coercive population-control 
through the IIRIRA, which amended the INA.S5 The amendment, 
codified at 8 U.S.c. § llOl(a)(42)(B), provides that "a person [1] who 
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
sterilization, or [2] who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to 
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive 
population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on 
account of political opinion."s6 The two parts of the amendment will 
77 Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec 16 (BlA 1989), 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(I)(iii) (Westlaw 
through 2006). Past persecution can be established through credible testimony without the need for 
corroborative evidence. Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998). 
78 Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004). 
79 Id. 
80 [d. (quoting Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir.1985». 
81 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
82 In re Fauziya Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357,374 (B.I.A. 1996). 
83 Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.l999). 
84 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I & N. Dec. 915, 925 (BIA 1997); see In re Chang, 201. & N. Dec. 38 
(B .LA. 1989). 
85 lllegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-
546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 10 I (a)(42)(B) (Westlaw through 2006». 
86 [d. (enumeration and emphasis added). 
9
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hereinafter be referred to as "clause [1]" and "clause [2]." The condition 
specified in clause [1] is sometimes referred to as "automatic eligibility 
for asylum," because the simple fact of involuntary abortion or 
sterilization results in eligibility for asylum, without any further showing 
of persecution.87 
This new change incorporated an additional definition of "refugee" 
specifically to aid Chinese nationals fleeing China in fear of harm for 
violating population-control policies.88 Clause [1] of the amendment 
mentions only the asylee's persecution and does not specifically allow a 
grant of asylum to the applicant's spouse for that persecution.89 
However, in considering In re C-Y-Z-, the BIA held that clause [1] also 
applies to the spouse of an individual who has been forced to have an 
involuntary abortion or sterilization.9o In lie Lin v. Ashcroft, the Ninth 
Circuit stated, in dictum, that the reasoning of C-Y-Z- might plausibly be 
extended to make clause [1] applicable also to the child of an individual 
who has been forced to have an involuntary abortion or sterilization.91 
Then, in Zhang, the Ninth Circuit retreated from its lie Lin dictum, 
deferring to the BIA's interpretation of clause [1] of 8 V.S.c. § 
1101(a)(42)(B).92 The BIA construed clause [1] as not applicable to the 
child of an individual who has been forced to have an involuntary 
abortion or sterilization.93 
The Zhang court, however, went on to hold that such a child may 
nevertheless be eligible for asylum under clause [2], based on the 
imputation to the child of the parent's "resistance to a coercive 
population control program.,,94 Because clause [2] (unlike clause [1]) 
does not provide for automatic eligibility for asylum, though, the child in 
such a case must prove that he or she suffered persecution because of the 
parent's resistance. 
87 See Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2(05). 
88 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(B) (Westlaw through 2006). 
89 [d. 
90 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1& N. Dec. 915, 919 (BIA 1997). 
91 Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004). In addition, if a child of 
persecuted parents is ineligible for asylum by not meeting the requirements for refugee status on his 
or her own, he or she may be granted the same status as a parent who is found eligible for asylum if 
the child is accompanying the parent or joining the parent at a later date in the United States. 8 
U.S.c. § I I 58(b)(3)(A) (Westlaw through 2(06); Devi v. Aguirre, No. C 05-01179 JSW, 2005 WL 
2656590, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 18,2005). 
92 Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 2005). 
93 [d. 
94 [d. at 1247; see also lie Lin, 377 F.3d at 1031. 
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II. ZHANG CASE 
Ms. Zhang emigrated from China to the United States in April 2000 
at the age of fourteen, due to the government persecution resulting from 
her parents' choice to have three children in violation of China's 
population-control policies.95 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
An Immigration Judge in Arizona initially heard Ms. Zhang's 
case.96 She then appealed to the BIA and later to the Ninth Circuit.97 
1. Basis of Zhang's Claim 
Ms. Zhang was born in Changla City, China, in 1985, followed two 
years later by her sister and over six years later by her brother. 98 
Families living in Ms. Zhang's rural village were permitted only two 
children per family in accordance with village governmental 
regulations.99 The family successfully concealed Ms. Zhang's younger 
brother from the authorities for six years, but they eventually had to 
record their son in the family register for him to attend school. 100 Upon 
learning of the Zhangs' third child, the government ordered Ms. Zhang's 
father to be sterilized. 101 In 2000, officials forcibly removed Ms. 
Zhang's father from his home to undergo the procedure. 102 Ms. Zhang 
later testified about the terrifying experience: "My mother was crying, 
and our sisters [sic] and brothers [sic] were crying, and we did not want 
my father to be taken away to be forced to terminate his reproductive 
ability.,,103 The operation left Ms. Zhang's father so physically 
weakened that he was unable to return to his job and unable to support 
the family.104 
In addition to sterilizing Ms. Zhang's father, officials fined the 
95 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1242-43. 
96 In re Xue Yun Zhang, BIA, A77 297 144 (Phoenix 2001). 
97 [d. 
98 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1243. 
99 [d. 
100 [d. In addition, the Zhangs reported the boy's birth to local officials. [d. 
101 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1243. 
102 [d. 
103 [d. 
104 [d. The U.S. also recognized that "sterilization operations are often debilitating in ways 
unrelated to reproductive functions." INS General Counsel Opinion Letter, Genco Op. No. 93-1, 
1993 WL 1503948 (Jan. 191993). 
11
Smith: Asylum for a Minor Child
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
80 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
Zhang family 23,000 renminbi (about $2,800) - an amount impossible 
for the family to pay.I05 Because the Zhang family could not pay the 
fine, the government confiscated the family's belongings, threatened 
eviction from their home, and prohibited the children from attending 
school. 106 With no educational prospects at home, the Zhangs arranged 
to smuggle Ms. Zhang into the United States with financial help from a 
relative. 107 Ms. Zhang's goal in emigrating was to escape persecution, 
obtain an education, and find employment in the United States.108 
However, upon her arrival at Los Angeles International Airport, the INS 
apprehended Ms. Zhang and detained her for removal proceedings. lo9 
2. Immigration Judge Decision 
At Ms. Zhang's removal hearing, the Immigration Judge ("U") held 
that despite her testimony being credible, she was not eligible for 
asylum. 110 The U held that the IIRIRA confers automatic eligibility for 
asylum on involuntarily sterilized persons and their spouses under clause 
[1] of 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(42)(B), but not on their unaccompanied 
children such as Ms. Zhang. lll The U also ruled that Ms. Zhang did not 
suffer individualized past persecution based on the specific facts and 
circumstances of her case. ll2 The U therefore found that Ms. Zhang did 
not have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of one of 
the five protected grounds. ll3 The U then denied Ms. Zhang's request for 
asylum, based on insufficient evidence. I 14 
3. Board of Immigration Appeals Decision 
In a timely appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") 
affirmed the U's decision and dismissed Ms. Zhang's appeal. 115 The 
105 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1243. Fines for violating birth quotas are typically assessed at two to 
three times a family's annual income. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices - 2000 (China), supra note 29, at "f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, 
Correspondence. " 
106 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1243. 
107 1d. 
108 1d. 
109 Id. at 1243-44. Ms. Zhang was held in detention in Arizona for several years, but the Ninth 
Circuit noted that she was not being detained by the time the case was heard in 2005. Id. at 1244. 
110 Id. at 1243. 
III Id. at 1243; see supra note 86 for statute. 
112 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1244. 
113 1d. 
1I4 1d. at 1243. 
115 1d. at 1243. The BIA and its opinions are binding across the U.S. as the appellate body 
12
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BIA held that Ms. Zhang had failed to meet her burden of establishing 
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecutionll6 on 
account of any of the statutorily protected grounds.1l7 The BIA stated 
that Ms. Zhang had not met her burden by adducing evidence "that her 
parents suffered harm, i.e., a fine, damaged furniture, and the forced 
sterilization of her father.,,118 Although the BIA addressed the expanded 
"refugee" definition that confers automatic eligibility for asylum on 
persons who have been forced to abort a pregnancy or undergo 
involuntary sterilization and their spouses {clause [1] of 8 U.S.c. § 
llOl(a)(42)(B)},1l9 the BIA refused to extend that provision to children 
of a forcibly sterilized parent. 120 Having exhausted her administrative 
remedies, Ms. Zhang then petitioned for judicial review by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 121 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
A Ninth Circuit panel122 reviewed the BIA's legal conclusions de 
novo, "granting deference to its reasonable interpretation of ambiguous 
statutory provisions,,,123 and reviewed the BIA's findings of fact -
particularly the finding that Ms. Zhang had not suffered persecutionl24 -
for substantial evidence.125 The Ninth Circuit deferred to the BIA by 
agreeing that Ms. Zhang was not automatically eligible for asylum under 
the IIRIRA provision regarding refugee status for victims of forced 
abortions or sterilizations {clause [1] of 8 U.S.c. § IlOl(a)(42)(B)}, 
even though both of her parents would be eligible for asylum under the 
designated to review decisions from the immigration court. 8 C.F.R. § 3.I(b) (Westlaw through 
2006). 
116 Zhang. 408 F.3d at 1243-44. 
117 The five protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. U.S.C § I 10 I (a)(42)(A) (Westiaw through 2006). 
118 In re Xue Yun Zhang, BIA, A77 297 144 (Phoenix 2001). 
119/d. 
120 Id. 
121 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1244. 
122 The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Robert E. Cowen (Senior United States Circuit 
Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation), Michael Daly Hawkins and William A. Fletcher, 
who wrote the unanimous opinion. 
123 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1244; see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999). 
Agency decisions and interpretations based on legal error fall under plenary review of the courts. 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,445-47 (1987). 
124 See Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1247-49. 
125 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. I (1992); Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 
1203 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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statute. 126 However, the court also found that the D's discretionary 
denial of Ms. Zhang's asylum application based on her· individual 
persecution for her parents' resistance to population controls was not 
supported by substantial evidence.127 
Therefore, the court remanded the case and instructed the D to 
reconsider the cumulative effect of the trauma Ms. Zhang suffered as a 
result of her father's forcible removal and sterilization, the economic 
deprivation she experienced, and her inability to pursue an education due 
to her family's choices, constituted persecution.128 The Ninth Circuit 
also instructed the D to re-evaluate whether Ms. Zhang had a well-
established fear of persecution should she return to China. 129 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION 
A. DEFERENCE TO BIA's CONSTRUCTION OF AUTOMATIC ELIGIBILITY 
First, the Ninth Circuit in Zhang was correct to retreat from its lie 
Lin dictum and defer to the BIA's construction of 8 V.S.c. § 
llOl(a)(42)(B), clause [1].130 The BIA's interpretation is not only 
reasonable; 13 1 it is the only reading that is supportable by a textual 
analysis of the plain language of the statute.132 The statute describes "a 
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo 
involuntary sterilization" as suffering persecution on account of political 
opinion. The statute does not expressly require that a child or a spouse 
of such a person be deemed to have been persecuted. 
However, subsequent interpretation of this statutory amendment has 
applied clause [1] to the spouse of a person who has been forced to 
undergo involuntary sterilization, so that the spouse is deemed 
automatically eligible for asylum. 133 This is largely because the forced 
sterilization of one spouse persecutes the other spouse by limiting the 
126 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1242. 
127 [d. at 1250. 
128 [d. at 1249. 
129 [d.; see also Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004). A court may decide 
that an applicant has been persecuted based on totality of circumstances and cumulative effect of 
incidents. [d. 
130 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1245; see 8 U.S.c. § 1101 (a)(42)(B) (Westlaw through 2006); see also 
supra note 86. 
131 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1245. 
132 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (West1aw through 2006); see supra note 86. 
133 Zhang. 408 F.3d at 1244; see also Ma v Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir. 2004); Li v 
Ashcroft, 356 F. 3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir 2004) (en bane); In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 
(BIA 1997). 
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latter's ability to have children with the sterilized spouse.134 "The 
evident purpose of these decisions is to fulfill Congress's goal in passing 
the amendments - to provide relief for 'couples' persecuted on account 
of an 'unauthorized' pregnancy and to keep families together.,,135 In 
deferring to the BIA's refusal to extend clause [I] to the child of an 
involuntarily sterilized parent, the Zhang court stated that "sterilization 
of a parent does not necessarily persecute a child, though of course in 
particular circumstances, it might.,,136 The court also pointed out that the 
legislative history of the amendment did not discuss the possibility of 
granting the automatic eligibility of clause [1] to children of forcibly 
sterilized parents. 137 
The issue for the BIA in In Re C-Y-Z- was whether the asylum 
applicant could establish statutory eligibility for asylum based on his 
wife's sterilization. 138 C-Y-Z-'s claim was based on the forced 
sterilization of his wife after they had a third child in violation of the 
population-control policies. 139 The U had found that nothing significant 
had happened to C-Y -Z- other than a threat of arrest and a one-day 
detention, but that he was trying to ride the coattails of his wife's 
persecution to claim persecution for himself. 14o However, the U's 
opinion was issued before the statutory amendment adding clause [I] of 
8 U.S.c. § 1 101 (a)(42)(B) was enacted. 141 
The BIA in C-Y-Z- described an INS memorandum stating the 
Service's position that the amendment applied to an applicant spouse of 
the person forced to undergo involuntary abortion or sterilization.142 The 
legal perspective that "the husband of a sterilized wife can essentially 
stand in her shoes and make a bona fide and non-frivolous application for 
asylum based on problems impacting more intimately on her than on 
him," basically grants the spouse clause [1] "automatic eligibility for 
asylum.,,143 Thus, the BIA found that C-Y-Z- had established 
persecution based on his wife's sterilization. 
A concurring opinion in C-Y-Z- went a step further, stating that an 
individual's close familial association with a person who resists or 
134 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1245. 
135 Ma, 361 F.3d at 559; see H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(1), at 174 (1996). 
136 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis added). 
137 Id. 
138 In re C·Y-Z-, 21 1& N. Dec. 915, 917 (BIA 1997). 
139 Id. at 916. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 917. 
142 Id. at 917. 
143 Id. at 918. See supra note 86. 
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opposes a compulsory population-control program may cause the 
political opinion of that person to be imputed to such individual. l44 This 
led the Ninth Circuit in lie Lin to state in dictum that the reasoning 
applied to give a spouse automatic eligibility might also be extended to 
give a child automatic eligibility.145 However, the "association with one 
who expressly resists" should be properly categorized under clause [2] of 
the statutory amendment to the refugee definition l46 and, therefore, 
would not grant automatic eligibility to the applicant in association as the 
lie Lin court seemed to think. The applicant could still rightly claim an 
imputed political opinion to establish persecution under clause [2] but 
would not be able to claim an automatic grant of eligibility under clause 
[1]. 
Lin, like Ms. Zhang, was fourteen when he arrived at the Los 
Angeles airport from China. 147 His mother had given birth to a second 
child in violation of the mandatory limits on procreation and had gone 
into hiding, leaving Lin with his grandparents. 148 As with Ms. Zhang's 
parents, the government imposed a heavy fine against Lin's parents. 149 
The lie Lin court's central holding was that Lin's counsel had denied 
him effective assistance by failing to collect available material testimony 
and documentary evidence to present his asylum claims, but the court 
couldn't resist opining on an asylum theory for Lin. 150 
The court described 8 V.S.c. §1101(a)(42)(B), clause [2], as the 
operative language of the amended statute to find persecution on account 
of political opinion to be imputed to children. 151 But then the lie Lin 
court blurred the distinction between clause [1] (which grants automatic 
eligibility) and clause [2] (which allows eligibility for a child based on 
the imputation of the parent's resistance to a coercive popUlation 
controls) when it used C-Y-Z-'s concurrence that would extend clause [1] 
based on an "association with one who expressly resists or opposes" the 
144 [d. at 922. 
145 Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014,1031 (9th Cir. 2004). 
146 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-
546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42)(B) (1996» (Westlaw through 2006). See supra 
note 86. 
147 lie Lin, 377 F.3d at 1019. 
148 [d. 
149 [d. at 1021. 
150 [d. at 1033-34. 
151 [d. at 1031 (''The operative language in § 1l01(a)(42) deems a person persecuted on 
account of political opinion if he is 'persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or 
for other resistance to a coercive population control program'; it does not say that that 'failure' or 
'refusal' or 'resistance' must have been his own. The discrimination or abusive treatment of children 
in families with more that one child may qualify them for refugee status."); see supra note 86. 
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coercive program. 152 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lin had a 
"plausible claim for relief' and that his attorney should have argued that 
the government officials attributed his parents' political opinion to him 
under clause [1].153 However, the language of clause [l] in the statute 
cannot support this extension, and the Ninth Circuit in Zhang was correct 
to return to the BIA's majority interpretation in C-Y-Z- that clause [1] 
simply grants automatic eligibility to the sterilized person and his or her 
spouse. 
B. IMpUT A nON OF PARENTS ' "RESISTANCE" To THEIR CHILD 
Second, the Zhang court also reasonably and correctly construed 
clause [2] of 8 V.S.c. § 1101(a)(42)(B) as being applicable to the child 
of a parent who resists coercive population-control measures. 154 The text 
of the statute does not require the person who is persecuted and seeking 
asylum to be the same person whose resistance is the motivation for the 
persecution. 155 Thus, a child who is persecuted because of the parent's 
resistance to population controls will be eligible for asylum. 
The Zhang court stated as follows: 
In this case, it was Ms. Zhang's parents who resisted China's coercive 
population control program. Their resistance, however, is imputed to 
Ms. Zhang for the purposes of determining whether she has been 
persecuted on account of a protected ground. . . . Here there is no 
doubt that the hardships Ms. Zhang suffered were on account of her 
parents' resistance to China's population control measures. 156 
The court cited to the C-Y-Z- concurrence, finding that association may 
cause a political opinion to be imputed. But the Zhang court considered 
this imputation by association properly under clause [2] of the statutory 
amendment instead of clause [1] as lie Lin did. The lie Lin court had 
stated that "the doctrine of imputed political opinion may offer no crisp 
method for distinguishing [a spouse and a child "in association" with a 
forcibly sterilized person].,,157 Correctly analyzing spouses under clause 
[1] and children under clause [2] does provide such a "crisp" method of 
152 lie Lin, 377 F.3d at 1031. 
153 1d. 
154 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1247. 
155 In re C-Y -Z-, 21 1 & N. Dec. 915, 923 (BIA 1997) (it would be "antithetical to the doctrine 
[of imputed political opinion] to suggest that it is only available when the persecuted victim whose 
views are imputed to the applicant also is applying for asylum."). 
156 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1246. 
157 1d. 
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distinction. 
The Zhang court then discussed the level of Ms. Zhang's 
persecution, quoting the INS Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims 
to the effect that "[t]he harm a child fears or has suffered ... may be 
relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as persecution.,,158 
The court rejected the U's conclusion that Ms. Zhang had not suffered 
persecution, because the U had relied on two factual findings not 
supported by the evidence: (1) that the actions of the Chinese did not 
deny Ms. Zhang access to an education, and (2) that the Zhang family 
could have paid the fine. Accordingly, the court granted Ms. Zhang's 
petition for review and remanded the case for the U to make a new 
determination of whether Ms. Zhang suffered persecution. To guide the 
U's determination on remand, the court stated that the U should consider 
the loss of property and income the family suffered, as well as the barrier 
the fine posed to Ms. Zhang's ability to pursue and education. The court 
also pointed out that the violence against Ms. Zhang's father is relevant 
to whether she had a well-founded fear of persecution. Finally, the court 
stated that the U should consider the cumulative impact of all the 
hardships imposed on Ms. Zhang as a result of her father's forcible 
removal and sterilization. 159 
C. CUMULATIVE HARDSHIPS SUFFERED UNDER PARENTS' 
PERSECUTION 
Third, Zhang'S retreat from the lie Lin dictum may have little 
practical effect on a child's ability to gain asylum based on involuntary 
abortion or sterilization forced on the child's parent. Even though a child 
in such a case will not be automatically eligible for asylum under clause 
[1] of 8 U.S.c. § llOI(a)(42)(B), typically a parent's forced sterilization 
will give rise to a multitude of hardships that may cumulatively rise to 
the level of "persecution" necessary to make the child eligible for asylum 
under clause [2] of the statute.160 This is illustrated by the circumstances 
of the Zhang case, in which the court instructed the U on remand to 
consider the cumulative impact of all of the hardships imposed on the 
child in connection with the parent's forced sterilization. 161 
158 Memorandum from the U.S. 0.0.1. I.N.S. on Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims to 
Asylum Officers, Immigration Officers and Headquarters Coordinators (Asylum and Refugees) File: 
120/11.26 (Dec. 10, 1998) p. 19, available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphicsllawsregslhandbooklIOa_ChldmGdlns.pdf. 
159 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1249. 
160 [d.; see Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
161 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1249. 
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Additionally, when the court was describing the reasons for its 
deference to the BIA holding, which would not extend clause [1] to grant 
automatic eligibility to children, the court stated that "in particular 
circumstances" sterilization of a parent might or would be considered 
persecution of a child. 162 The court could have clarified that in 
discussing the "particular circumstances" 163 the court was in fact 
referring to elements that would fall under clause [2]. While the court 
stated that it could not conclude that the BIA's interpretation of the 
statute is unreasonable or absurd, the court failed to pursue the inquiry as 
to the circumstances under which a child would be entitled to statutory 
eligibility for asylum based on the parent's persecution by sterilization. 164 
Since the court felt constrained by "deference to [the BIA's] reasonable 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions." the court could have 
included, in its guidance for the U on remand, a suggestion that the U 
consider the circumstances under which a child would be entitled to 
asylum based on a parent's forcible sterilization.165 Evaluation of such 
circumstances might include the following: 
(I) Age, sex and marital status of the child. 166 
(2) Mental and physical development of the child. 167 
(3) Physical presence and custody of the child at the time of 
sterilization of the parent. 168 
(4) The actual effect on the child of the sterilization and persecution 
of the parent. 169 
(5) Harmful treatment of the child by the officials conducting the 
sterilization and persecution of the parents. 170 
(6) Economic deprivation. 171 
(7) Denial of access to education. 172 
(8) Adverse consequences to the child. 173 
162 [d. at 1245; see supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
163 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1245. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 1244. 
166 Li v Ashcroft, 356 F. 3d 1153, 1164 (9th Cir 2004). 
167 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1979, at 'll 214, p. 35, 
HCR/IP/eng/Rev.l Reedited 1992. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
binltexis/vtxlhome!opendoc.pdfltbl=PUBL&id=3d58e 13b4. 
168 Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1029 (9th Cir 2(04). 
169 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1243. 
170 In re C-Y-Z-, 21 1& N. Dec. 915, 923 (BIA 1997). 
171 Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 
172 Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 1997). 
173 Zhang, 408 F.3d at 1247. 
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This Note contends that the U and the BIA on remand, and the 
Ninth Circuit in any subsequent appeal in this case or in other cases, 
should pursue consideration of the "particular circumstances" under 
which sterilization of a parent might or would be considered an element 
or contributing factor in the persecution of a child. 
The trauma suffered by Ms. Zhang included the shock and distress 
at seeing the violent and forcible removal of her father and then knowing 
that he was being sterilized against his Will.174 The hardships also 
included the fine and the economic deprivation she experienced when 
personal belongings were taken and the family was threatened eviction 
from their home, and the denial to her of the ability to pursue an 
education.175 The court considered that these taken cumulatively could 
constitute persecution, but the court remanded to the U to make its 
finding based on the all of these hardships. 176 
This Note also contends that, in addition to imputing Ms. Zhang's 
parents' resistance for the purpose of determining whether she has been 
persecuted on account of a protected ground, the circumstances, actual 
harm, and persecution of Ms. Zhang's parents should also be considered 
in evaluating the level of Ms. Zhang's persecution. The court did direct 
the U to consider the trauma suffered by Ms. Zhang as a result of her 
father's forcible sterilization; the court should also have instructed the U 
to consider the full circumstances of her parents' persecution on remand 
of the case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court should have described the "particular circumstances" 
under which sterilization of a parent might or would be considered as 
persecution of a child. The court, in addition, should have induded the 
circumstances, actual harm, and persecution of Ms. Zhang's parents as 
an additional factor to be considered in evaluating the level of Ms. 
Zhang's persecution. Also helpful in the court's instructions on remand 
would have been a specific reminder that the harm a child fears or has 
suffered may be relatively less than that of an adult and still qualify as 
persecution. 
174 [d. at 1243. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 1248-49. 
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